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ABSTRACT 
 
 
JAMES H. IRVING, II:  The Information Content of Internal Controls Legislation:  Evidence 
from Material Weakness Disclosures 
(Under the direction of Wayne Landsman) 
 
 
    This paper examines the information content of internal controls legislation, as mandated 
by Sections 302 and 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.  I draw on two conventional 
measures of information content  stock return volatility and trading volume  and find that 
these two measures exhibit a statistically larger event period reaction to firms initial material 
weakness disclosures relative to an adjacent non-event period and to a matched sample of 
control firms.  In the multivariate setting, I find a significant, positive relation between the 
material weakness variable and both information content measures after controlling for 
multiple other sources of event period news.  In an additional test of informativeness, I find 
support for the hypothesis that Section 404 disclosures are incrementally informative to the 
initial Section 302 disclosures.  Collectively, the evidence suggests that investors respond to 
the information contained in material weakness disclosures, consistent with these disclosures 
providing an additional piece of value-relevant news for investors to consider in making 
resource allocation decisions. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 This paper examines whether public disclosure of internal control information affects the 
trading behavior of equity investors.  Specifically, I investigate whether material weakness 
disclosures are associated with contemporaneous stock price changes and/or increased 
trading volume.  Internal controls over financial reporting are the set of routine policies and 
procedures governing the financial transactions of a firm, as established and enforced by 
management.  Examples range from segregating the duties of employees to developing a 
consistent methodology for estimating the value of an asset or liability.  An effective system 
of internal controls protects the integrity of transactions recorded as inputs to the financial 
reporting system and aggregated into financial reports.  If large and/or systematic 
deficiencies are embedded within a firms system of internal controls, past, present, and 
future financial data upon which capital market participants base their decisions may be 
distorted. 
 Despite the seemingly fundamental significance of internal controls to consumers of 
financial reports, public disclosure about a firms system of internal controls was very limited 
before the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX Act).  In particular, pre-SOX Act SEC 
regulations required a firm to report on internal control issues only when making a change in 
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its independent auditor (SEC, 1988).1  Sections 302 and 404 of the SOX Act prompted an 
exogenous change in internal control reporting, from a regime of virtually no disclosure or 
legal liability risk to a regime of mandated disclosure at fixed intervals with considerable 
legal penalties.2  Subsequent to the August 29, 2002 SOX Act inception date, all public 
registrants began periodically evaluating and reporting on the effectiveness of their internal 
controls systems. 
 A key policy question surrounding the internal controls legislation asks whether mandated 
Section 302 and 404 disclosures have been effective in accomplishing the main objective of 
the SOX Act  [T]o protect investors by improving the accuracy and reliability of corporate 
disclosures.  On the one hand, proponents characterize the costs associated with Sections 
302 and 404 as an investment with long-term benefits and a step in the right direction for 
corporate reform.  Samuel DiPiazza, CEO of the public accounting firm 
PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC), summarizes this view:  We are finding that the focus on 
internal controls is uncovering problems at the best of companies.3 
 On the other hand, chief executives and corporate lobbying associations have criticized the 
imbalance and inflexibility of the new internal control disclosure rules.  In voicing their 
disapproval, they argue that benefits of the legislation are hard to spot, while the costs are 
much larger than expected and consist of not only cash resources but also productivity losses.  
                                                        
1 In a study of mandatory internal control disclosures, Whisenant et al. (2003) finds that, for a sample of 1,264 auditor 
changes spanning the 4-year period 1993-1996, internal control-related reportable events surface in only 83 (6.6%) of 
the filings.  Prior work with respect to voluntary internal control disclosures (Raghunandan and Rama, 1994 and 
McMullen et al., 1996) finds that firms discretionary disclosures are limited and tend to focus on the existence rather 
than the effectiveness of their internal control systems. 
 
2 Section 906 of the SOX Act establishes monetary penalties of up to $5 million and/or imprisonment of up to 20 years 
for certifying executives who knowingly withhold information from their financial reports. 
 
3 No Escaping Sarbanes-Oxley. Business Week Online Edition, January 6, 2005. 
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Additionally, these critics are puzzled as to why the internal control disclosure rules are 
applied uniformly to public registrants that differ considerably on dimensions such as 
industry, size, and complexity.  Even SEC Commissioner Paul Atkins has weighed in on the 
topic, stating, Perhaps nothing in recent memory has more starkly illustrated the need to 
perform honest and probing cost/benefit analyses before requirements take effect than the 
regulatory regime that has grown under Section 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.4 
 A thorough assessment of the effectiveness of the SOX Acts internal control disclosure 
provisions would require, at a minimum, an operational definition of effectiveness, a viable 
cost-benefit model, an evaluation from the perspective of each capital market stakeholder 
group, and an extended time series of data.  Consequently, this paper considers a necessary 
condition for determining the effectiveness of the internal control disclosure provisions  
informativeness  by examining the information content of material weakness disclosures.5  
In an effort to build on prior and concurrent research studying the effect of internal control 
disclosures on firms stock returns, I adopt a different methodology and employ two 
conventional measures of information content:  unexpected return volatility (URV) and 
unexpected trading volume (UTV). 
 I find that investors react significantly to the information contained in firms initial 
material weakness disclosures.  Specifically, I collect a sample of 565 unique firms 
disclosing initial material weaknesses for the period extending from the SOX Act inception 
date through the end of the inaugural Section 404 reporting period.  A univariate analysis 
                                                        
4 Remarks before the National Association of State Treasuries, Incline Village, Nevada, September 20, 2005. 
 
5 Material weaknesses, the most severe type of internal control issues, are the focal point of this study.  The SOX Act 
requires disclosure of material weaknesses under both Sections 302 and 404.  Internal control issues below the material 
weakness threshold (significant deficiencies and control deficiencies) are not mandatory disclosures. 
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compares this treatment sample of material weakness firms in a short-window event period 
with:  (i) the treatment sample in an adjacent non-event period; and (ii) a control sample of 
non-internal control issue firms within the event period.  I find that the treatment sample 
URV (UTV) mean in the event period is 1.9 times (2.1 times) larger than the URV (UTV) 
treatment sample mean in the non-event period.  Similarly, I find that, within the event 
period, the treatment sample URV (UTV) mean is 2.0 times (1.8 times) larger than the URV 
(UTV) mean of the corresponding control sample.  Statistical tests of differences in sample 
means confirm that the treatment sample is measurably larger than both the non-event period 
and the control sample.6 
 In cross-sectional regression models that control for event period news, I find a significant, 
positive relation between the primary material weakness variable and both information 
content measures.  The evidence from this multivariate analysis supports the univariate 
findings and is robust to a number of sensitivity checks.  In a supplemental test, I find 
support for the hypothesis that there is information in firms Section 404 disclosures 
incremental to their initial Section 302 material weakness disclosures.  Collectively, the 
evidence suggests that investors respond to the information contained in material weakness 
disclosures, consistent with the internal control disclosure provisions of the SOX Act 
providing an additional piece of value-relevant news for investors to consider in making 
resource allocation decisions. 
 The paper proceeds as follows:  Section 2 provides an institutional overview.  Section 3 
reviews the extant literature and Section 4 develops the hypotheses.  Section 5 introduces the 
                                                        
6 Differences in event period medians for the treatment sample across both information content measures are also 
statistically larger relative to both the non-event period median and the control sample median.  I report both mean and 
median results in Section 6. 
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research design.  Section 6 details the sample selection process and describes the data.  
Section 7 presents the empirical results and Section 8 concludes. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 2 
 
INSTITUTIONAL OVERVIEW 
 
 
 Prior to the late twentieth century, there was no formal benchmark for evaluating the 
effectiveness of internal controls.  Likewise, prior to the early twenty-first century, there was 
practically no public disclosure on internal controls.  The following sections review the 
evolution of assessing and reporting on internal controls. 
 
2.1  The evolution of internal control policy 
 
 The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 (FCPA) was the first formal attempt at 
legislating internal control policy.  A primary element of this legislation required SEC 
registrants to develop and sustain an adequate system of internal controls.  In 1992, the 
Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission (COSO) developed a 
model of internal controls.  The resulting publication, Internal Control  Integrated 
Framework, identified the components central to an effective system of internal controls, 
providing a benchmark by which firms could more rigorously evaluate their internal control 
systems.  The Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) issued Auditing 
Standard No. 2 (AS2) in 2004 as a blueprint for management and its independent auditor to 
use in assessing internal controls effectiveness.7  AS2 more concretely delineated the levels 
                                                        
7 The PCAOB is a non-profit organization created by Title I of the SOX Act whose primary responsibility is to oversee 
the independent auditing profession. 
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of internal control issues and endorsed the COSO framework as a suitable and available 
framework for purposes of managements assessment. (AS2, ¶14). 
 
2.2  Internal control provisions of the SOX Act 
 
 Sections 302 and 404 of the SOX Act made use of the technology developed by FCPA, 
COSO, and the PCAOB to put the new internal control disclosure regime into action.  In 
addition to thoroughly documenting and testing internal controls, SEC registrants were now 
obligated to publicly report their findings.  In particular, Section 302 requires a firms top 
executives to certify the accuracy of corporate financial reports in each quarterly and annual 
SEC filing.  A central part of this section entails disclosing whether there are significant 
changes in internal controls or in other factors that could significantly affect internal controls 
(Section 302(a)(6)).  Firms began making disclosures in accordance with the Section 302 
guidance in the first fiscal period subsequent to the SOX Act effective date (for a calendar 
year firm, the third quarter of 2002).  Section 404 requires the management of accelerated 
registrants to annually assess and report on the effectiveness of internal controls over 
financial reporting, beginning with fiscal years ending after November 15, 2004.8  Section 
404 also requires a firms auditor to issue an opinion on the effectiveness of the firms 
internal controls.9 
                                                        
8 Accelerated registrants are firms that have:  (i) a market capitalization exceeding $75 million, (ii) been traded on a 
public exchange for a minimum of 12 months, and (iii) previously filed at least one annual report.  Non-accelerated 
registrants and foreign registrants have been granted additional time to comply with Section 404.  While a firms 
Section 404 effective date was determined according to registrant type, Section 302 was uniformly effective for all 
public registrants beginning on August 29, 2002. 
 
9 The internal controls opinion is separate but not entirely independent from the financial statement opinion.  If a firms 
internal controls are ineffective and the auditor is unable to adequately audit around the existing problem areas, this 
could affect the financial statement opinion issued. 
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 To illustrate how Sections 302 and 404 work in tandem, consider the example of Coeur 
dAlene Mines Corporation (Coeur), a calendar year-end firm that trades on the New York 
Stock Exchange.  Coeur reported an initial material weakness pertaining to improper revenue 
recognition within its June 30, 2004 Form 10-Q.  Reporting this material weakness was a 
mandatory disclosure under Section 302, since it represented a significant change in internal 
controls from its prior reporting period.  Coeur made a similar Section 302 disclosure in its 
September 30, 2004 Form 10-Q to communicate that it had fully corrected the material 
weakness, again representing a significant change from the prior period. 
 Because Coeur met the criteria of an accelerated registrant, it was required to comply with 
Section 404 for its December 31, 2004 year-end.  In its Form 10-K, Coeur identified three 
new material weaknesses in its Section 404 mandatory disclosure.10  Consequently, Coeurs 
management concluded that internal controls over financial reporting were not effective at 
December 31, 2004, and its independent auditor (KPMG) issued an adverse opinion on the 
effectiveness of Coeurs internal controls.  The adverse opinion signified that KPMG agreed 
with Coeurs management that the firms internal controls were ineffective.  These 
disclosures by Coeurs management and KPMG fulfilled the requirements of Section 404. 
                                                        
10 As was the case with Coeur, management often incorporated the Section 302 update into its Section 404 report.  For 
this reason, it is important to study both disclosures as the sample period extends into 2005. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 3 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 
 Two areas of the accounting literature motivate this paper:  (i) information content and 
disclosure-relevance studies; and (ii) market-based internal control disclosure studies.  I 
review these two literatures below, followed by a discussion of the distinguishing features in 
the current study. 
 
3.1  Information content and disclosure-relevance studies 
 
 A large prior literature establishes that earnings announcements provide information to 
investors relevant for making resource allocation decisions.  The seminal studies of Ball and 
Brown (1968) and Beaver (1968) were the first to document empirically the association 
between accounting earnings and stock prices.  The main result of Ball and Brown (1968) 
reveals a consistent, positive association between the sign of firms unexpected earnings 
changes and the sign of their unexpected stock returns.  The evidence in Beaver (1968) 
corroborates the general findings of Ball and Brown (1968).  Using two alternate measures of 
information content, price volatility and trading volume, Beaver (1968) observes a 
pronounced increase in both measures at the time of firms announcements of earnings.  
Together, these two studies conclude that the earnings number affects the beliefs and activity 
of investors, and therefore is a useful statistic. 
 Accounting researchers have considered elements of the financial reporting system other 
than earnings in succeeding information content studies.  One line of research investigates 
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the incremental contribution of non-earnings financial statement data in explaining stock 
prices.  For example, Lipe (1986) finds that individual components of earnings possess 
information content incremental to the earnings number.  Bowen et al. (1987) and Wilson 
(1987) find that accruals have information content incremental to that contained in cash 
flows and earnings.  Another line of research examines the information content of footnote 
disclosures accompanying the financial statements.  For instance, Barth et al. (1992) 
examines the relation between pension expense disclosures and stock prices, while Aboody 
(1996) finds an incremental association between employee stock option disclosures and stock 
prices. 
 Of particular relevance to this paper, information content studies extend to disclosures 
within statutory filings but independent of the financial statements and footnotes.  These 
studies have established a relation between stock prices and dividend announcements, 
management comments, and operating data (Hoskin et al., 1986), management discussion 
and analysis disclosures (Bryan, 1997), and managerial actions (Rajgopal et al., 2002).  
Finally, accounting researchers have considered events other than the earnings announcement 
date.  Foster et al. (1978, 1983) and Wilson (1986) compare the incremental information 
content of disclosures reported at the annual report date relative to an earlier period.  Easton 
and Zmijewski (1993), Campbell et al. (2001), and Griffin (2003) examine the investor 
response at Form 10-K and Form 10-Q filing dates. 
 Sections 302 and 404 of the SOX Act require that a firm make, at a minimum, a disclosure 
about the effectiveness of its internal controls within each quarterly and annual SEC filing.  
This disclosure, like many disclosures required by the Securities Exchange Acts and 
Regulation S-K, is made outside of the financial statements and accompanying footnotes.  
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Thus, this paper contributes to the literature on the capital market effects of mandated 
supplemental disclosures. 
 
3.2  Market-based internal control disclosure studies 
 
 The financial press has publicized the expectation that capital market participants will 
build consideration of internal control disclosures into their decision-making models and 
evaluation criteria.11  However, recent internal controls studies are inconclusive with regard 
to the effect of internal control disclosures on directional stock returns.  For a sample period 
that pre-dates the SOX Act, Whisenant et al. (2003) finds an insignificant negative 
association between stock returns and internal control issues disclosed at the time of firms 
auditor changes.  The authors hypothesize that the absence of a significant association exists 
because either internal control issues are predictable or they are confusing and/or lack 
precision.  Bryan and Lilien (2005) finds that mean raw and abnormal returns for a sample of 
161 material weakness firms are not different from zero.  Likewise, Hammersley et al. 
(2005), which obtains a sample of 364 internal control issue firms from November 2003 
through January 2005, finds that 2-day abnormal returns are not statistically distinguishable 
from zero.  The Bryan and Lilien (2005) and Hammersley et al. (2005) results reconcile with 
the findings of Whisenant et al. (2003), but are contrary to the conclusions drawn in Beneish 
et al. (2005) and DeFranco et al. (2005). 
 Beneish et al. (2005) reports a 3-day abnormal return of 1.71 percent for 336 material 
weaknesses disclosed during the calendar year 2004.  Similarly, DeFranco et al. (2005) 
reports a 3-day abnormal return of 1.77 percent for a sample of 102 firms reporting internal 
                                                        
11 For instance, see Section 404:  How is the Marketplace Likely to Respond to the First Wave of Internal Control 
Reports? Ernst & Young Board Matters, April 2005 and Section 404 Reports on Internal Control:  Impact on Ratings 
Will Depend on Nature of Material Weaknesses Reported. Moodys Investor Service, October 2004. 
 12
control issues from November 2003 through December 2004.  Test statistics from both of 
these studies indicate that the abnormal returns are significantly different from zero.  Given 
the mixed evidence in the prior and contemporaneous studies, an open question remains 
regarding whether internal control disclosures are informative to investors. 
 
3.3  Current study 
 
 The concluding remarks of Whisenant et al. (2003) include an acknowledgment that 
further research is needed to evaluate  competing explanations regarding the information 
content of such disclosures.  To this end, I incorporate four distinct sample selection and 
research design features in an effort to build upon the prior and contemporaneous literature 
and more closely explore the investor response to internal controls legislation.  First, I draw 
on two information content measures that do not require a model of investor expectations, 
and therefore study the magnitude of price changes and volume activity without regard to 
whether internal control disclosures are positive or negative news.  A material weakness 
disclosure could yield a positive signal to the degree that it alleviates prior uncertainty 
surrounding the firm.12  Further, the investment may even develop into a positive net present 
value project, whereby a firm is able to improve its operating performance in future periods 
in addition to complying with the internal control rules.  Conversely, it is difficult to envision 
the most egregious material weaknesses as anything other than a negative event.  Typically, 
the firms making these disclosures have abundant and/or entrenched internal control 
problems embedded deep within the organization, leading to a lengthy and costly 
remediation process. 
                                                        
12 American International Group and Symbol Technologies are examples of firms where tremendous uncertainty in 
prior periods actually produced a large positive movement in stock price at the time of their material weakness 
disclosures. 
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 Second, I do not rely upon the Compliance Week website (CW) commonly used in recent 
internal control studies to gather my sample.  Rather, I use a keyword search methodology to 
isolate 1,311 unique firms with internal control issues.  Remarkably, more than 600 of these 
firms are not reported by CW and, more importantly, 231 of the 565 sample firms (41 
percent) are not contained within CW.13  Additionally, I collect the sample over considerably 
broader time horizon relative to the concurrent studies (to include the first full year of 
Section 404 reports).  Together, these steps preclude the potential selection bias and external 
validity concerns associated with using CW, to the extent that it is not representative of the 
population of firms with material weaknesses. 
 Third, I examine only material weaknesses, which are mandated disclosures in both SOX 
Act internal control reporting settings.  I exclude firms reporting the two types of voluntary 
internal control deficiencies, significant deficiencies and control deficiencies, because they 
are less serious infractions and they are not subject to the legal liability risks of those firms 
with material weaknesses.  Additionally, it is not clear that a firms primary motivation for 
making voluntary internal control disclosures is to inform the investing public, which opens 
the door for alternative information asymmetry and incentive stories.  Finally, I incorporate a 
test to assess the incremental effect of Section 404.  Because Section 404 is the most 
criticized and most costly part of the entire SOX Act, it is important to study the effect it has 
on investors.  This paper is the first known study to independently examine Section 404 
disclosures. 
                                                        
13 The internal controls section of the Compliance Week website contains a disclaimer noting that it does not purport to 
have an inclusive list of firms with internal control issues, but rather a sampling of reported disclosures. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 4 
 
HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
 
 
 If material weakness disclosures prompt investors to rebalance their portfolios, it follows 
that this piece of information is relevant.  There are a host of reasons why it is logical to 
expect a material weakness disclosure to elicit such a reaction.  For example, it provides 
management with more reliable data for use in decision-making.  Additionally, it provides a 
signal about the firms governance and oversight mechanisms (Krishnan, 2005) and financial 
statement quality (Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2005) and Doyle et al. (2005)).  There are also 
alternative explanations for why a material weakness disclosure may not be informative.  
These include:  (1) investors believe an unqualified financial statement opinion is an 
adequate indicator of the credibility of the firms financial reports; (2) the disclosures are 
difficult for investors to interpret; and (3) the disclosures are pre-empted by news leaking out 
ahead of the public filing or through an announcement correlated with the material weakness 
(i.e., a restatement). 
 I operationalize informativeness using two complementary measures from the prior 
literature:  return volatility and trading volume.14  I expect a material weakness disclosure to 
contain information content if:  (i) the price changes (apart from whether it increases or 
decreases) reflecting an aggregation of investors beliefs, (ii) the volume increases because 
investors trade on the information, or (iii) both scenarios are observed. 
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4.1  Unexpected return volatility 
 
 Beaver (1968) introduced a measure of unexpected stock return volatility (URV), which 
compares price changes within an event period vis-à-vis price changes outside of the event 
period.  An advantage of this measure is that it captures the magnitude of a firms price 
change without regard to the sign.  Given that internal controls are a fundamental element of 
a firms financial reporting system, uncertainty surrounding the effectiveness of a firms 
internal controls may alter investors beliefs about the future prospects of the firm and lead to 
a change in equilibrium price at the time of the disclosure.  I will interpret an elevated event 
period URV for firms disclosing initial material weaknesses relative to the non-event period 
and the control sample as containing information content.  Accordingly, my first hypothesis, 
stated in alternative form, is: 
 
H1:  The event period return volatility of material weakness-disclosing firms is 
greater relative to the non-event period and greater than the return volatility of the 
control sample within the event period. 
 
 
4.2  Unexpected trading volume 
 
 The prior literature has developed a measure that captures investors activity in addition to 
their beliefs.  This measure, also introduced in Beaver (1968), is unexpected trading volume 
(UTV).  Even if the heterogeneous beliefs of investors with respect to a firms material 
weakness disclosure result in a marginal directional stock price reaction, it is still conceivable 
that the disclosure will stimulate investors to trade more actively on the information.  Similar 
to the return volatility expectation, I predict that a significant volume reaction will occur at 
                                                                                                                                                                            
14 A number of prior studies use one or both of these observable measures of informational value.  See, for example, 
Kiger (1972), Morse (1981), Bamber (1986), Cready and Mynatt (1991), Atiase and Bamber (1994), Kohlbeck and 
Magilke (2002), and Landsman and Maydew (2002). 
 16
the time of a firms material weakness disclosure.  I will interpret an elevated event period 
UTV for firms disclosing initial material weaknesses relative to the two benchmarks (i.e., the 
non-event period and the control sample) as possessing informational value.  Hypothesis 2, 
stated in alternative form, is: 
 
H2:  The event period trading volume of material weakness-disclosing firms is 
greater relative to the non-event period and greater than the trading volume of the 
control sample within the event period. 
 
 
4.3  Incremental information content of Section 404 
 
 A large proportion of the negative press from the SOX Act was targeted specifically at the 
perceived onerous requirements of Section 404.  Compared with Section 302, the Section 
404 disclosures rules are more specific and the reporting responsibilities of management and 
its auditor are increased.  The interrelation between Sections 302 and 404 creates a setting in 
which it is possible to observe the investor response to both types of disclosures issued by the 
same firm.  I develop a third hypothesis that measures the incremental effect of a firms 
Section 404 adverse opinion conditional on the existence of a prior Section 302 material 
weakness disclosure. 
 Presumably, investors have incorporated the information from a firms prior material 
weakness disclosure(s) into their future assessment of the firm.  For firms that disclose 
material weaknesses under Section 302 (302-firms) and subsequently receive an adverse 
opinion under Section 404, I will interpret the Section 404 disclosures as informative using 
the same criteria as in hypotheses 1 and 2.  Specifically, if those firms exhibit significantly 
greater price and volume reactions at their adverse opinion date relative to their control firm 
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matches (who receive a clean Section 404 opinion), then the disclosures contain 
informational value.  Consequently, the third hypothesis, stated in alternative form, is: 
 
H3:  The values of the information content measures for 302-firms, as computed at 
the Section 404 reporting date, are greater than the information content measure values 
of the control sample. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 5 
 
RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
 
 To test the hypotheses, I compute URV and UTV for each day in the event period, [-1,+1], 
and the non-event period, [-10,-2] and [+2,+10], for both the material weakness sample and 
the control sample, as follows: 
 
5.1  Information content proxies 
 
 Following prior studies that examine return volatility, I compute URV as the square of a 
firms unexpected return (the squared residual after removing market-level effects) 
standardized by the estimated variance of the firms unexpected returns.  Specifically, the 
unexpected return volatility measure, as calculated for each firm-day, is: 
 
URV  =  [RF  (θ1 + θ2*RM)]2 / RVVAR       (1) 
 
where RF is a firms raw return, RM is the equally-weighted market return from CRSP, and θ1 
and θ2 are coefficient estimates from a firm-specific market model.  The denominator, RVVAR, 
is the estimated variance of the firms market model unexpected returns (i.e., the mean 
squared residual outside of the window [-10,+10]).  θ1, θ2, and RVVAR are calculated in an 
estimation period spanning [-250,-11]. 
 Consistent with the prior trading volume literature, I scale a firms daily trading volume by 
its daily shares outstanding.  I label this unadjusted measure of firm-specific volume VF.  I 
adjust VF for an expected volume proxy, E[VF].  I define E[VF] as the median of a firms 
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trading volume divided by its shares outstanding over the period [-250, -11].15  Thus, the 
unexpected trading volume measure, as calculated for each firm-day, is: 
 
UTV  =  VF    E[VF]         (2) 
 
5.2  Multivariate model 
 
 In testing hypotheses 1 and 2, I attempt to separate the effects of the material weakness 
disclosure from certain unrelated and potentially confounding effects.  For instance, I assume 
that the average expected effects of changes in wealth, risk and consumption in the short 
event-window are zero.  Likewise, I estimate market model-equivalent regressions to 
mitigate the effects of macroeconomic factors.  Of course, it is likely that additional elements 
contribute to the behavior of return volatility and/or trading volume at the time of the 
material weakness disclosure.  For instance, a portion of an observed rise in return volatility 
and/or trading volume may occur because a firm announces the material weakness disclosure 
simultaneous with its announcement of earnings.  Similarly, the announcement of an 
important piece of industry-specific or firm-specific news concurrent with the material 
weakness disclosure, such as a regulatory investigation or a restatement, may account for a 
share of the increase.16 
 To control for these potentially contaminating effects, I construct a model that regresses 
the set of information content measures on a material weakness variable, MW, and proxies 
                                                        
15 I also consider a variation of UTV that adjusts VF for market effects, analogous to the methodology used in 
constructing URV.  Untabulated results are qualitatively consistent with those of the primary UTV measure. 
 
16 The magnitudes of the information content measures are overstated in a univariate setting that does not control for 
sources of significant news.  However, the relation between the material weakness and control samples should (on 
average) remain unaltered as long as the composition of news events are comparable across the two samples.  
However, Panel C of Table 4 shows that each of the explanatory variables occur in differing frequencies (differing 
magnitudes for EA_D*UE) across the two samples. 
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for event period news.  The resulting empirical specification, which borrows from the 
research design structure of Landsman and Maydew (2002), is as follows: 
 
ICMi  =  α0 + α1MWi + α2EA_Di + α3(EA_D*UE)i + 
 
      α4ACC/FINi + α5LEG/REGi + α6OPERi + εi     (3) 
 
 
ICM denotes the set of information content dependent variables, {URV, UTV}.  The 
independent sums of URV and UTV over the 3-day event period, [-1,+1], relative to the 
material weakness disclosure date [0] represent the two measures used in the multivariate 
tests.17  URV and UTV are as defined in Sections 4.1.  The definitions for the independent 
variables in Equation 3 are as follows: 
 
! MW is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the firm is part of the material weakness 
sample and 0 if it is part of the control sample (see Section 5.3, Control Sample). 
! EA_D is an indicator variable that equals 1 if a firm reports earnings within the         
[-1,+1] event period, and 0 otherwise. 
! For a firm making its internal control disclosure concurrent with an earnings 
announcement (i.e., EA_D = 1), UE is the magnitude of the firms unexpected earnings.  
UE equals NI  ANF, where NI is the actual earnings per share reported by I/B/E/S and 
ANF is the firms most recent I/B/E/S consensus analyst earnings per share estimate prior 
to the event period (a proxy for expected earnings). 
! Firm-specific announcements have been partitioned into three distinctive categories 
of indicator variables that equal 1 if a firm reports a significant news item within the [-
1,+1] event period (other than EA_D), and 0 otherwise.  The three categories are: (i) 
                                                        
17 The multivariate results are insensitive to the alternative event windows [-2,+2] and [0,+1]. 
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ACC/FIN, a proxy for accounting and finance announcements (e.g., restatements, auditor 
changes, merger and acquisition activity, dividend revisions, analyst and credit rating 
revisions); (ii) LEG/REG, a proxy for legal and regulatory announcements (e.g., lawsuits, 
IRS and SEC inquiries); and (iii) OPER, a proxy for operational announcements (e.g., new 
customers, new contracts, new product introductions). 
 
5.3  Incremental test of Section 404 
 Hypothesis 3 is a complementary test to hypotheses 1 and 2.  If an adverse Section 404 
opinion contains new information, then a firm disclosing a material weakness in periods prior 
to the Section 404 effective date should also experience a significant reaction at the date of 
its ineffective management assessment and adverse auditor opinion.  To test this third 
hypothesis, I restrict the original material weakness sample to those firms that receive an 
adverse Section 404 opinion in a period subsequent to their initial Section 302 material 
weakness disclosure (along with their corresponding control firm matches).  I estimate 
Equation 3 on this sub-sample, where all variables are measured at the adverse opinion date.  
A significant, positive MW coefficient estimate will suggest that Section 404 disclosures 
contain information incremental to the initial Section 302 disclosure. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 6 
 
SAMPLE SELECTION AND DESCRIPTION 
 
 
6.1  Data sources 
 
 Sections 302 and 404 require public registrants to disclose internal control issues within 
their statutory filings but outside of the financial statements and accompanying footnotes.18  
To identify these initial internal control issues, I used the advanced keyword search on an 
interface of archived SEC filings maintained by PricewaterhouseCoopers.19  The sample 
spans the period August 29, 2002 (the SOX Act inception date) through May 31, 2005 (the 
end of the first Section 404 reporting period).  For this date range, I sequentially searched 
each SEC filing type on a range of keywords, including material weakness, significant 
deficiency, control deficiency, control weakness, reportable condition, and reportable 
event. 
 Table 1 records the sample selection methodology.  For better than half of the sample, it 
was necessary to retrieve an earlier filing to isolate the initial internal control issue 
disclosure.20  At the conclusion of the collection process, the sample consisted of 1,311 
internal control issue firms.  I eliminated 421 firms that voluntarily disclosed internal control 
                                                        
18 Internal control issues are disclosed in Item 9A of the Form 10-K, Item 4 of the Form 10-Q, and in a variety of Form 
8-K types. 
 
19 This interface, known as Edgarscan, is located at edgarscan.pwcglobal.com/servlets/edgarscan. 
 
20 Once the initial filing was identified, I determined the precise event date using the SEC EDGAR website timestamp, 
as found in the Table of submitted documents page for each firm.  If the timestamp reflected a time that was after the 
close of the domestic equity markets (i.e., 4:00 p.m. EST), I coded day 0 as the following trading day. 
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issues (i.e., significant deficiencies and/or control deficiencies).  Of the 890 material 
weakness firms, I removed 29 firms that were consolidated subsidiaries of a parent company 
already in the sample and 19 firms where no description of the material weakness was 
provided.  Finally, I eliminated 277 firms that did not have all of the requisite accounting 
and/or stock market variables.  Many firms without complete data either were privately-held 
or, more commonly, were too small to warrant coverage by one or more of the data 
providers.  These screens reduced the sample to a final count of 565 unique material 
weakness firms. 
 To complement the hand-collected internal control disclosure data, I collected additional 
data necessary to provide a complete descriptive analysis and execute the empirical tests 
from four electronic databases.  These data types and data providers include:  accounting 
variables from Compustat, stock market variables from CRSP, analyst variables from 
I/B/E/S, and audit variables from Audit Analytics.  To conclude the data collection, I created 
EA_D and the news proxies by reading each firms SEC filings during [-1,+1] and by 
performing a firm-by-firm news search using the Factiva business news service spanning the 
event window [-1,+1].21 
 
6.2  Material weakness sample firm characteristics 
 
 Table 2 and the corresponding untabulated data provide a descriptive profile of the 
material weakness sample.  Beyond having implications for the empirical analysis, these 
attributes also provide insights into whether the sample appears to map into the general 
reported trends of this period. 
                                                        
21 The event period SEC/Factiva news search is conducted for the material weakness and control samples.  I also 
extend the search one day on each side of the [-1,+1] event period (i.e., [-2,+2]) as a conservative attempt to account for 
all major firm-specific news in the event period.  The primary inferences of Table 5 remain unaltered. 
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 Panel A tabulates seven types of material weakness disclosures, as modeled after the 
COSO framework.  It is common for a firms disclosure to overlap across classification 
types.  As anticipated, the size of firms with Type 1 issues (inadequate personnel and/or 
segregation of duties) is substantially below the average firm size.  Type 2 issues 
(deficiencies in policies and procedures) and Type 3 issues (misapplication of GAAP or 
valuation issues) are the most frequent disclosures types, each occurring in more than 40 
percent of the sample.  To provide added context to the content of these disclosures, Panel B 
groups those firms that mention a financial statement account area within their material 
weakness disclosures.  Accounts in which a large degree of discretion is permitted by the 
accounting rules (income taxes, leases, inventory, and accruals) appear with the greatest 
regularity. 
 Panel C tabulates the incidence of miscellaneous sample characteristics.  Almost three in 
ten firms reported more than one material weakness in their internal controls.  80 percent of 
the sample firms complied with Section 404 and received an opinion from their independent 
auditor.  70 percent (5 percent) of these firms received adverse (disclaimed) opinions, while 
the remainder (25 percent) received unqualified opinions.22  During the sample period, ten 
percent of the sample were involved in a regulatory investigation and better than half of the 
sample firms restated their financial statements.  The sample includes 7 percent (8 percent) of 
the Fortune 500 (Fortune 1000), validating PwC CEO DiPiazzas statement that internal 
control issues are present within many well-known public registrants.  Panel D partitions the 
material weakness sample according to industry, replicating the classification developed by 
Barth et al. (1998).  The distribution is generally in line with the 2004 Compustat population 
                                                        
22 The 112 firms without a Section 404 opinion are split between non-accelerated registrants (N=101) and foreign 
registrants (N=11). 
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of firms, with the exception of a larger concentration of computer and retail firms and a 
smaller concentration of financial firms.23 
 A first set of untabulated descriptive statistics examines material weakness sample firms 
by stock exchange and SEC filing type.  NASDAQ firms (61 percent) outnumber New York 
Stock Exchange firms (30 percent) by a 2-to-1 ratio and American Stock Exchange firms (9 
percent) by more than a 6-to-1 ratio.  With respect to filing type, the majority of initial 
material weakness disclosures appear in the 10-K form class (58 percent), with the remainder 
evenly split between the 10-Q form class and the 8-K/Other form class (21 percent each). 
 A second set of untabulated descriptive statistics considers auditor characteristics of the 
material weakness sample.  The Big 4 public accounting firms service more than 80 percent 
of the sample.  KPMG and PwC audit more firms with material weaknesses as a percentage 
of their total audit revenues than do Deloitte & Touche or Ernst & Young.  More than one-
third of the material weakness firms change auditors during the sample period, typically in 
the time surrounding the material weakness disclosure.  Interestingly, 115 firms moved from 
Big 4 to non-Big 4 firms, while only 8 firms upgraded to the Big 4 firms from the non-Big 
4 firms.  Finally, the change in audit fees reported by material weakness firms is in line with 
the anecdotal evidence quantifying the economic burden of internal controls compliance.24  
The mean (median) total audit fees for the material weakness sample in the year of the 
material weakness disclosure are 2.3 times (1.9 times) total audit fees in the immediately 
                                                        
23 The greater proportion of computer firms is at least partially attributable to firm size, with more than two-thirds of the 
material weaknesses reported by these firms relating to Type 1 or Type 2 issues.  The larger incidence of retail firms is 
primarily due to firms modifying their accounting for leases and leasehold improvements to comply with the guidance 
issued by the Office of the Chief Accountant of the SEC on February 7, 2005.  The smaller percentage of financial 
firms is likely a manifestation of similar internal control regulatory requirements governing these firms before the SOX 
Act (FDICIA, 1991). 
 
24 The Costs of Being Public in the Era of Sarbanes-Oxley, Foley & Lardner LLP, June 16, 2005. 
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preceding year and 4.8 times (3.9 times) the base year (generally 2000, the first SEC-
mandated year for audit fee disclosures). 
 
6.3  Control sample 
 
 To estimate Equation 3, it is necessary to have variation in the MW variable.  However, the 
original material weakness sample contains a uniform set of firms reporting material 
weakness disclosures, where the MW indicator variable is equal to one in every case.  A 
technique for achieving the requisite variation is to form a matched sample of control firms.  
The ideal control match is a firm that is homogeneous to its prospective material weakness 
counterpart across all attributes except for the content of its internal control disclosure. 
 To collect this matched sample, I first eliminate from the set of potential candidates all 
firms disclosing internal control issues during the post-SOX Act period.25  Next, I omit 
candidates with insufficient stock market or accounting data during the [-1,+1] event period 
or the [-250,-11] estimation period.  Finally, I match each firm in the material weakness 
sample with a control firm on four sequential dimensions:  industry (2-digit SIC code), size 
(total asset decile, and then the closest level of total assets within the decile), filing type 
(annual or quarterly statutory filing), and time (fiscal year-end and year).26  Each of the 
resulting 565 control firms is identical to its material weakness firm match on all four 
                                                        
25 To ensure that I draw the control firms from an uncontaminated population, I collect all firms disclosing any of the 
three types of internal control issues from August 2002 through May 2005.  The residual of firms listed in the 
Compustat annual file report no internal control issues during the sample period and represent the group from which I 
select the control sample. 
 
26 Recent internal control studies (Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2005), Bryan and Lilien (2005), Doyle et al. (2005), and Ge 
and McVay (2005)) find that determinants of material weaknesses include complexity, profitability, and growth.  I 
consider incorporating these determinants into my matching technique; however, adding one or more of these 
additional screens results in many unmatched firms.  Even so, I indirectly control for these additional determinants 
through the size measure.  Unreported correlations, computed separately for the material weakness and control 
samples, confirm that size is positively correlated with complexity (number of operating segments) and profitability 
(return on assets), and negatively correlated with growth (annual change in sales), which reconciles with the findings of 
these recent studies. 
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dimensions, with the exception of a handful of cases in which it was necessary to relax the 
fiscal year-end restriction.27 
                                                        
27 I establish for each control firm a 3-day event period centered on its Form 10-K or Form 10-Q filing date and as 
close to the event date of its corresponding material weakness match as possible.  The majority of control firm 
disclosures are made during the same week as their material weakness match, with exceptions occurring when the 
material weakness firm:  (i) discloses its initial material weakness with an earnings or restatement announcement;  (ii) 
delays its 10-K or 10-Q filing; or (iii) does not have the same fiscal year end as its control firm match. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 7 
 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
 
7.1  Abnormal returns tests 
 
 Before testing my hypotheses, I first replicate the abnormal returns tests conducted by 
concurrent internal control studies using my expanded sample.  An abnormal return, AR, is 
computed for each sample firm within the [-1,+1] event period.  AR equals a firms 
cumulated 3-day raw return less an expected return.  The expected return proxy is the value-
weighted market return from CRSP cumulated over the 3-day event period.  The distribution 
of AR for the material weakness sample is presented in Figure 1.  The distribution 
unexpectedly resembles a normal distribution, with only the slightest indication of left-tail 
asymmetry.  Given this evidence, I do not make a prediction on how a firms material 
weakness disclosure will affect its stock price. 
 Table 3, Panel A provides a univariate comparison of the abnormal return variable 
between the material weakness and control samples.  The mean AR for the material weakness 
sample is statistically different from the control sample AR at the five-percent level.  
However, the median AR for the material weakness sample is only marginally significant 
from the control sample (at the ten-percent level).  Furthermore, the mean material weakness 
sample AR is not significantly different from zero (t-statistic of 1.55).  Table 3, Panel B 
provides the results from estimating Equation 3 with AR as the dependent variable.  The 
coefficient on MW is statistically significant at the five-percent level for the full sample of 
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material weakness disclosures.  Then again, this result is sensitive to extreme AR values, as 
the coefficient is only marginally significant when the abnormal return observations are 
winsorized to the 1-percent and 99-percent levels.  Analogous to the concurrent internal 
control studies, the results and interpretation of the abnormal returns tests straddle the line 
between significance and insignificance, depending on how extreme values are treated and 
whether or not a prediction is made on the relation between material weakness disclosures 
and stock returns. 
 
7.2  Univariate analysis 
 
 Turning to Figure 2, as hypothesized, the Beaver spike is present in the event period for 
both the return volatility and trading volume measures.  The first graph plots URV means for 
the material weakness and control samples over the [-10,+10] horizon.  The URV mean in the 
[-1,+1] event period is 1.9 times the URV mean in the [-10,-2], [+2,+10] non-event period.  
Within the event period, the URV mean for the material weakness sample is 1.9 times the 
corresponding control sample URV mean.  The second graph in Figure 2 depicts the trading 
volume response to material weakness disclosures in the event period relative to the non-
event period and the control sample.  The material weakness sample UTV mean in the event 
period is 2.0 times the respective UTV mean in the non-event period.  Likewise, within the 
event period, the material weakness sample UTV mean is 1.7 times the control sample UTV 
mean. 
 Figure 2 indicates that the return volatility and trading volume responses are most 
pronounced on days 0, 1, and 2.  Statistical tests of difference in means and medians 
corroborate the graphical evidence.  The t-statistics and z-statistics reported in Table 4, Panel 
A reveal that the URV and UTV means and medians within the event period are significantly 
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larger for the material weakness sample relative to the control sample.  Untabulated t-
statistics and z-statistics also establish that, for the material weakness sample, both event 
period information content measures have statistically larger means and medians than their 
non-event period equivalents. 
 The economic significance of the return volatility and trading volume measures mirrors 
the findings of prior studies (Beaver (1968) and Landsman and Maydew (2002), among 
others).  The average return volatility on day 0 for the material weakness sample is nearly 
double the non-announcement period benchmark value of 1.0.  Similarly, expressing in 
trading volume in economic terms, for every 10 shares traded by material weakness-
disclosing firms in the event period, 5.1 shares are traded by the same firms in the non-event 
period and 5.7 shares are traded by the matched sample of control firms. 
 Overall, the univariate results are consistent with the first and second hypotheses.  
Additionally, Panel B of Table 4 confirms that MW is significantly correlated with both 
measures of information content.  However, several of the explanatory variables are also 
significantly correlated with one another.  For example, the correlation between MW and 
ACC/FIN and the correlation between EA_D and its interaction with UE are positively 
correlated.  I examine the independent contributions of each explanatory variable in 
predicting URV and UTV in the subsequent multivariate analysis. 
 
7.3  Multivariate analysis 
 To test the predictions of hypotheses 1 and 2 in the multivariate setting, I estimate 
Equation 3 for the full sample of initial material weakness disclosures and report the 
regression summary statistics in Table 5.  As predicted, the coefficient on the primary 
variable of interest, MW, is positive and statistically significant at the one-percent level in 
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both the URV and UTV models.  This result suggests that initial material weakness 
disclosures elicit a response by investors, consistent with investors using the information to 
make resource allocation decisions. 
 The coefficient on the concurrent earnings announcement variable, EA_D, and the 
interaction of EA_D with UE are also positive and significant in both models, consistent with 
the evidence in Beaver (1968) and other information content studies.  This result indicates 
that the existence of an earnings announcement, as well as the magnitude of the earnings 
surprise, provides additional information to investors.28  Two of the three control variables 
for potentially confounding event period news are a determinant of the information content 
measures in one or both of the empirical specifications.  The coefficient on ACC/FIN, the 
proxy for accounting and finance firm-specific news, is positive and significant in both the 
URV and UTV models, while the coefficient on LEG/REG is significant in the UTV model.29 
 
7.4  Ranking MW types by level of severity 
 In Table 5, each material weakness disclosure is weighted equally.  However, it is 
plausible that investors consider the severity of a firms material weakness(es) when updating 
their beliefs about the firm.  To determine whether investors responses vary according to 
material weakness type, I aggregate the categories of Table 2, Panel A into a more severe 
group (MORE) and a less severe group (LESS) and estimate Equation 3 separately for each 
group.  MORE contains firms with GAAP or valuation deficiencies (excluding leases), 
revenue recognition issues, control environment concerns, or three or more types of material 
                                                        
28 Explanatory variables controlling for the effects of prior earnings announcements and earnings surprises were also 
included in an expanded version of Equation 3.  Neither coefficient was significantly related to URV or UTV. 
 
29 I adjust the OLS standard errors for each coefficient estimate in Table 5 by the White (1980) heteroscedasticity 
consistent estimator.  This correction does not affect any inferences with the exception that the coefficient on LEG/REG 
in the UTV model turns from significant at the 5-percent level to insignificant. 
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weaknesses.  LESS includes firms disclosing inadequate staffing and/or segregation of 
duties, insufficient reconciliation or review procedures, lease-related GAAP deficiencies, and 
information technology issues. 
 I expect the probability that MORE firms have abundant and/or entrenched problems that 
may result in distorted financial reports will be greater than LESS firms.  Accordingly, I 
predict that those firms with MORE weakness types will elicit a stronger URV and UTV 
response from investors relative to LESS weakness types.  The ranking scheme is validated 
by partitioning Figure 1 according to material weakness type.  A large proportion of MORE 
firms reside in the tails, while LESS firms generally populate the center of the distribution.  
As added support for this prediction, Table 6 confirms that the MW coefficient is significant 
at the one-percent level in both models of information content for MORE, while the MW 
coefficient is significant at the ten- (five-) percent level in the LESS URV (UTV) models. 
 
7.5  Incremental information content test 
 Table 7 presents the regression summary statistics from testing the hypothesis of whether 
Section 404 disclosures are incrementally informative to investors.  Equation 3 is re-
estimated at the adverse opinion date for the reduced sample of firms disclosing an initial 
material weakness in periods before Section 404 took effect.  The coefficient on the variable 
of interest, MW, is statistically significant at the five-percent level in both the URV and UTV 
models, which, although not as strong as the main result, is consistent with hypothesis 3.  The 
finding that the investor reaction to firms Section 404 adverse opinions is dampened relative 
to their initial Section 302 disclosures (a strong predictor of a Section 404 adverse opinion) is 
consistent with a result in Chen and Church (1996), which finds that the stock market 
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reaction to firms bankruptcy filings is reduced relative to their prior going concern opinions 
(a strong predictor of bankruptcy). 
 Further analysis reveals that a time element is a partial explanation for this result.  Firms 
making their initial Section 302 disclosures in close proximity to the Section 404 adverse 
opinion (SHORT) have a comparatively larger reaction than firms with a sizeable time gap 
between their Section 302 and Section 404 disclosures (LONG).30  This pattern is consistent 
with the result of a prior study by Elliott and Hanna (1996).  Elliott and Hanna (1996) finds 
that information content decreases monotonically as additional disclosures of the same type 
(in their case, special items) are made.  LONG firms have provided at least three additional 
updates about the status of their material weakness(es) in annual/quarterly filings between the 
initial disclosure and the adverse opinion.  To the contrary, the Section 404 disclosure is 
likely the first update that SHORT firms have provided since their initial disclosure.  Thus, it 
is logical that the market is more attuned to the information in SHORT filings.  Taken as a 
whole, the results of Table 7 suggest that investors find incremental information in Section 
404 disclosures when a firm has previously reported a material weakness under Section 302. 
 
7.6  Robustness checks 
 I carry out several untabulated tests to establish that the primary result of Table 5, a 
positive relation between MW and URV / UTV, is robust to alternative specifications and 
sample partitions.  First, I delete firms with concurrent event period news (earnings and other 
firm-specific news announcements) and re-estimate Equation 3.  To the extent that the 
control variables do not precisely capture the effects of contemporaneous event period news, 
                                                        
30 SHORT is defined as those firms with less than 60 trading days (i.e., one quarter) between the initial material 
weakness disclosure and the adverse opinion.  LONG is defined as those firms where greater than 250 trading days 
(i.e., one year) has elapsed between the initial material weakness disclosure and the adverse opinion. 
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this sub-sample test calibrates the effect of a material weakness disclosure in the cleanest 
setting possible.  Upon omitting all material weakness firms with event period news (along 
with their accompanying control sample matches), the coefficient on MW remains significant 
at the one-percent level across both the URV and UTV models. 
 Both the URV and UTV distributions are positively skewed, and therefore violate the 
classical OLS assumption of normality.  Table 5 attempts to mitigate the effect of outlying 
values by winsorizing the URV and UTV distributions at the 1-percent and 99-percent levels.  
To further alleviate the concern that extreme values may be driving the result, I re-estimate 
Equation 3 after transforming URV and UTV by ranking them and by taking their natural 
logarithm.  The inferences of Table 5 are unaffected by these transformations. 
 Finally, in the primary multivariate analysis I assume that investors place equal weight on 
the disclosures made under Sections 302 and 404.  However, it is conceivable that investors 
will react differently to disclosures made under these two SOX Act subsections, particularly 
since Section 404 requires additional reporting by both management and its auditor.  To 
verify that one of the SOX Act subsections is not driving the results, I estimate Equation 3 
separately for Section 302 and 404 disclosures.  I find that the positive relation between MW 
and the information content measures persists in both sub-samples.  It is somewhat 
surprising, however, that the MW coefficients and t-statistics are larger in the Section 302 
models (significant at the one-percent level) as compared with the Section 404 models 
(significant at the five-percent level). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 8 
 
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
 
8.1  Conclusions 
 Prior to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, an absence of publicly accessible data precluded 
accounting researchers from studying internal controls.  A primary emphasis of the SOX Act 
centers on expanding corporate disclosure requirements and, in particular, on the internal 
control disclosure requirements as enforced by Sections 302 and 404.  This unanticipated 
shift in the internal control disclosure regime has supplied an opportune setting to document 
and test the effects of internal control disclosures. 
 This paper uses a sample of initial material weaknesses reported by firms between August 
2002 and May 2005 to study price and volume responses to internal control disclosures.  
Univariate tests detect pronounced and statistically significant event period return volatility 
and trading volume responses to material weakness disclosures, as compared with the same 
sample in a bordering non-event period and a control sample of non-internal control issue 
firms.  Cross-sectional regression models of return volatility and trading volume reveal that a 
significant, positive relation between firms material weakness disclosures and the two 
measures of information content persists after controlling for multiple sources of event period 
news. 
 The results of this study extend the existing market-based internal control studies by 
providing a more complete picture of the relation between internal control disclosures and 
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observable measures of informational value.  The indication that investors find these 
disclosures informative suggests that the internal control legislation instituted by the SOX 
Act has supplied at least some benefits to the capital markets, irrespective of whether the 
legislation is viewed as effective or ineffective.  This evidence is timely and instructive for 
policymakers, as they continue to refine accounting and auditing standards and with the 
second year of Section 404 reporting well underway. 
 
8.2  Future research 
 The analyses in Sections 7.3 and 7.4 provide some indication of how investors perceive 
the initial news of a material weakness in internal controls.  To corroborate these findings, a 
sensible next step is to examine firms material weakness disclosures over time.  This 
analysis is viable because Sections 302 and 404 collectively require an update on the status 
of firms internal controls in each quarterly and annual SEC filing. 
 Section 7.5 takes a first pass by comparing firms initial Section 302 material weakness 
disclosures with their ensuing Section 404 adverse internal controls opinion.  However, 
studying broader intertemporal patterns in firms material weakness disclosures (i.e., quarter 
by quarter over several periods beyond the initial announcements) will help to sort out the 
duration over which firms systems of internal controls remain deficient and the degree to 
which capital market participants respond to remediation actions taken by the firm.  This 
time series analysis has the added advantage of eliminating the need to predict whether a 
material weakness disclosure is good news or bad news, since a firms succeeding internal 
control disclosures can be evaluated relative to its initial material weakness disclosure. 
 A firms performance following its initial material weakness disclosure will likely be a 
decreasing function of its time to remediate.  A preliminary inspection of the patterns of 
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sample firms remediation efforts reveals that firms disclosing material weaknesses fall 
somewhere on a continuum consisting of two extremes.  At the one extreme are firms that 
disclose a material weakness and correct it quickly, occasionally even within the same 
quarter in which it is discovered.  It is unlikely that these firms will suffer anything other than 
a temporary setback in stock price and/or operating performance.  At the other extreme are 
firms that disclose a material weakness and need multiple statutory filing periods to correct 
it.  These firms often uncover additional material weaknesses during the remediation stage, 
which prolongs their non-conforming status.  The market will almost certainly penalize these 
firms, as investors and other capital market participants begin to question more than the 
quality of their internal control systems. 
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Appendix: 
Variable definitions 
 
 
NOTE:  These variable definitions pertain to the ensuing figures and tables. 
 
AR is the market-adjusted abnormal return over the [-1,+1] event window relative to event 
date [0].  It equals a firms cumulated raw return less an expected return, measured as the 
cumulated value-weighted market return from CRSP. 
 
URV is unexpected return volatility, and equals RVAVE / RVVAR summed over the [-1,+1] event 
window relative to event date [0].  RVAVE is the square of RF  (θ1 + θ2*RM), where RF is a 
firms cumulated raw return, RM is the equally-weighted market return from CRSP, and θ1 
and θ2 are coefficient estimates from a firm-specific market model.  RVVAR is the estimated 
variance of the firms market model unexpected returns (i.e., the mean squared error).  θ1, θ2, 
and RVVAR are calculated in the [-250,-11] estimation period. 
 
UTV is unexpected trading volume, computed as VF less the median VF in the [-250,-11] non-
event estimation period.  This difference is summed over the [-1,+1] event window relative to 
event date [0].  UTV was transformed by a power of 102 for expositional purposes. 
 
MW is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the firm is part of the material weakness sample 
and 0 if it is part of the control sample (see Section 5.3, Control Sample). 
 
EA_D is an indicator variable that equals 1 if a firm reports earnings within the [-1,+1] event 
period, and 0 otherwise.  For a firm making its internal control disclosure concurrent with an 
earnings announcement (i.e., EA_D = 1), UE is the magnitude of the firms unexpected 
earnings.  UE equals NI  ANF, where NI is the actual earnings per share reported by I/B/E/S 
and ANF is the firms most recent I/B/E/S consensus analyst earnings per share estimate prior 
to the event period (a proxy for expected earnings). 
 
Firm-specific announcements have been partitioned into three distinctive categories of 
indicator variables that equal 1 if a firm reports a significant news item within the [-1,+1] 
event period (other than EA_D), and 0 otherwise.  The three categories are:  (i) ACC/FIN, a 
proxy for accounting and finance announcements (to include restatements, auditor changes, 
merger and acquisition activity, dividend revisions, analyst and credit rating revisions), (ii) 
LEG/REG, a proxy for legal and regulatory announcements (to include lawsuits, IRS and 
SEC inquiries), and (iii) OPER, a proxy for operational announcements (to include new 
customers, new contracts, new product introductions). 
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Figure 1: 
 
Distribution of abnormal returns for material weakness firms 
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The abnormal return is computed as a firms cumulated raw return for the [-1,+1] event 
period less the cumulated value-weighted market return over the identical event period. 
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Figure 2: 
 
URV and UTV over the window [-10,+10] 
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The URV mean in the event period is 1.9 times the non-event period URV mean and 2.1 times 
the event period control sample mean.  The UTV mean in the event period is 2.0 times the 
non-event period UTV mean and 1.8 times the event period control sample mean.  The event 
period is defined as [-1,+1] and the non-event period is defined as [-10,-2] and [+2,+10], both 
relative to event day [0]. 
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Table 1: 
 
Sample selection 
 
 
Unique firms with initial internal control issues 1,311 
    Less: Internal control issues not rising to the level of material weakness (421) 
Initial material weakness disclosures 890 
    Less: Consolidated subsidiary of a parent company already in the sample (29) 
             No description of the material weakness is provided (19) 
             Incomplete Compustat and/or CRSP data * (277) 
Final sample 565 
 
 
* The loss of these material weakness-disclosing firms is primarily a function of size.  In large part, these firms 
trade on over-the-counter exchanges and are considered too small to merit coverage by the commercial data 
providers.  Firms without public equity also contribute to this number. 
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Table 2: 
 
Material weakness sample firm characteristics 
 
 
PANEL A:  Material weaknesses by classification type 
 
Type 1:  Personnel, segregation of duties 135 23.9% 
Type 2:  Reconciliations, review, monitoring, classification 248 43.9% 
Type 3:  Application of GAAP, valuation of account-specific items 248 43.9% 
Type 4:  Revenue recognition 63 11.2% 
Type 5:  Information technology or information systems 23 4.1% 
Type 6:  Control environment 34 6.0% 
Type 7:  Three or more types of material weaknesses 78 13.8% 
 
 
 
PANEL B:  Material weaknesses by financial statement account area 
 
Income taxes 85 15.0% 
Leases 72 12.7% 
Inventory 55 9.7% 
Accruals 51 9.0% 
Long-term assets 42 7.4% 
Investments 33 5.8% 
Stock options 32 5.7% 
Derivatives 28 5.0% 
 
 
 
PANEL C:  Miscellaneous sample characteristics 
 
Greater than 1 material weakness 164 29.0% 
404 opinion issued by auditor 453 80.2% 
Ineffective internal control opinion 
     - Adverse 
     - Disclaimer 
318 
23 
70.2% 
5.1% 
Regulatory investigation 55 9.7% 
Restatement 312 55.2% 
Fortune 500 firm 33 5.8% 
Fortune 1000 firm 80 14.2% 
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Table 2 (continued): 
 
Material weakness sample firm characteristics 
 
 
PANEL D:  Industry composition 
 
Industry SIC Codes MW sample 2004 Compustat 
Chemicals 2800-2824, 2840-2899 9 1.6% 161 2.1% 
Computers 3570-3579, 3670-3679, 7370-7379 113 20.0% 1102 14.3% 
Extractive 1300-1399, 2900-2999 22 3.9% 269 3.5% 
Financial 6000-6411 61 10.8% 1140 14.8% 
Food 2000-2111 6 1.1% 144 1.9% 
Insurance/Real Estate 6500-6999 17 3.0% 376 4.9% 
Manufacturing 3000-3569, 3580-3669, 3680-3999 102 18.1% 1410 18.3% 
Mining/Construction 1000-1299, 1400-1999 10 1.8% 206 2.7% 
Pharmaceuticals 2830-2836 29 5.1% 471 6.1% 
Retail 5000-5999 73 12.9% 622 8.1% 
Services 7000-7369, 7380-8999 57 10.1% 643 8.3% 
Textiles/Print/Publish 2200-2780 16 2.8% 257 3.3% 
Transportation 4000-4899 33 5.8% 447 5.8% 
Utilities 4900-4999 16 2.8% 331 4.3% 
Other 9000+ 1 0.2% 129 1.7% 
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Table 3: 
 
Tests of directional abnormal stock returns 
 
 
PANEL A:  Univariate statistics 
 
Treatment sample Control sample     
Mean Median Std Mean Median Std Prediction t-stata z-statb 
AR 0.54 0.20 0.08 0.28 0.11 0.05 (?) 2.01* 1.66 
 
a The t-statistic is a t-test for a difference in means between the material weakness and control samples. 
 
b The z-statistic is a Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon test for a difference in medians between the material weakness 
and control samples. 
 
 
PANEL B:  Regression summary statistics 
 
ARi = α0 + α1MWi + α2EA_Di + α3(EA_D*UE)i + α4ACC/FINi + α5LEG/REGi + α6OPERi + εi 
 
  
Prediction 
  
 Full sample 
Winsorizing 
1% and 99% 
Intercept (?) 0.004 0.002 
     t-stat  1.07 0.80 
MW (?) 0.009 0.006 
     t-stat  2.25* 1.73 
EA_D (?) 0.003 0.004 
     t-stat  0.45 0.64 
EA_D*UE (+) 0.022 0.022 
     t-stat  2.21* 2.52** 
ACC/FIN (?) 0.017 0.009 
     t-stat  3.13** 1.91 
LEG/REG (?) 0.017 0.017 
     t-stat  1.69 1.86 
OPER (?) 0.002 0.002 
     t-stat  0.26 0.32 
    
Adjusted R2  0.02 0.02 
# of Obs    1,130   1,130 
 
 
** and * denote significance at the 1% and 5% levels, respectively (a one-tailed test statistic when a prediction 
on the sign is made and a two-tailed test statistic otherwise).  All variables are as defined in Appendix 1. 
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Table 4: 
 
Univariate tests of the treatment and control samples 
 
 
PANEL A:  Univariate statistics for the information content variables 
 
Treatment sample Control sample     
Mean Median Std Mean Median Std Prediction t-stata z-statb 
URV 5.26 1.74 10.05 2.90 1.41 4.68 (+) 4.98** 3.31** 
UTV 1.28 0.30 2.76 0.66 0.15 1.83 (+) 4.38** 3.81** 
 
** and * denote significance at the 1% and 5% levels, respectively (a one-tailed test statistic when a prediction 
on the sign is made and a two-tailed test statistic otherwise). 
 
a The t-statistic is a t-test for a difference in means between the material weakness and control samples. 
 
b The z-statistic is a Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon test for a difference in medians between the material weakness 
and control samples. 
 
 
PANEL B:  Correlations 
 
 URV UTV MW EA_D EA_D*UE ACC/FIN LEG/REG OPER 
URV  0.39 0.15 0.22 0.11 0.08 0.01 0.01 
UTV 0.38  0.13 0.13 0.09 0.07 0.07 0.03 
MW 0.10 0.12  0.11 0.08 0.12 0.11 0.08 
EA_D 0.17 0.16 0.11  0.52 0.01 0.01 0.01 
EA_D*UE 0.10 0.08 0.07 0.07  0.02 0.02 0.02 
ACC/FIN 0.05 0.07 0.12 0.01 0.05  0.05 0.03 
LEG/REG 0.01 0.04 0.11 0.01 0.06 0.05  0.07 
OPER 0.01 0.03 0.08 0.01 0.05 0.03 0.07  
 
Pearson product-moment correlations are above the diagonal and Spearman rank-order correlations are below 
the diagonal.  Correlations in bold (italics) are significant at the 1% (5%) level. 
 
 
PANEL C:  Explanatory variables 
 
 Treatment sample mean Control sample mean 
MW 1.00 0.00 
EA_D 0.22 0.15 
EA_D*UE 0.05 0.01 
ACC/FIN 0.27 0.18 
LEG/REG 0.06 0.02 
OPER 0.09 0.14 
 
 
NOTE:  All variables in this table are as defined in Appendix 1. 
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Table 5: 
 
Return volatility and trading volume regressions 
 
 
Summary statistics from cross-sectional regressions of the information content measures on 
the material weakness variable and controls for event period news 
 
ICMi = α0 + α1MWi + α2EA_Di + α3(EA_D*UE)i + α4ACC/FINi + α5LEG/REGi + α6OPERi + εi 
 
 Prediction   URV   UTV 
Intercept (?) 1.946 0.427 
     t-stat  5.25** 3.78** 
MW (+) 2.052 0.566 
     t-stat  4.36** 3.94** 
EA_D (+) 4.159 0.749 
     t-stat  6.86** 4.07** 
EA_D*UE (+) 1.552 0.909 
     t-stat  3.00** 2.56** 
ACC/FIN (+) 2.057 0.423 
     t-stat  3.25** 2.19* 
LEG/REG (+) 1.082 0.702 
     t-stat  0.93 1.97* 
OPER (+) 0.497 0.260 
     t-stat  0.68 1.15 
    
Adjusted R2  0.07 0.04 
# of Obs    1,130   1,130 
 
 
** and * denote significance at the 1% and 5% levels, respectively (a one-tailed test statistic when a prediction 
on the sign is made and a two-tailed test statistic otherwise).  ICM is the set of information content dependent 
variables {URV, UTV}.  All other variables are as defined in Appendix 1.  URV and UTV are winsorized at the 
1% and 99% levels to mitigate the effect of outliers. 
 
NOTE:  This model is estimated on a sample of 1,130 firms:  565 from the material weakness sample reporting 
an initial material weakness disclosure, along with the corresponding 565 matched firms from the control 
sample. 
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Table 6: 
 
Partitioned material weakness variable regressions 
 
 
Summary statistics from cross-sectional regressions where the material weakness firms are 
divided into a more severe group (MORE) and less severe group (LESS). 
 
ICMi = α0 + α1MWi + α2EA_Di + α3(EA_D*UE)i + α4ACC/FINi + α5LEG/REGi + α6OPERi + εi 
 
URV UTV  
MW coefficient    t-stat MW coefficient    t-stat 
MORE 1.973 4.16** 0.484 3.56** 
LESS 1.417 1.58 0.344 1.71* 
 
 
** and * denote significance at the 1% and 5% levels, respectively (one-tailed test statistic).  ICM is the set of 
information content dependent variables {URV, UTV}.  All other variables are as defined in Appendix 1.  The 
observations winsorized in Table 5 remain winsorized in this sub-sample. 
 
NOTE:  The MORE ICM models are estimated on a sample of 346 firms:  173 from the material weakness 
sample along with the corresponding 173 matched firms from the control sample.  The LESS ICM models are 
estimated on a sample of 286 firms (143 each from the material weakness and control samples).  The remaining 
498 firms (249 material weakness firms and 249 corresponding control firms) had more than one type of 
material weakness. 
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Table 7: 
 
Section 404 incremental information content regressions 
 
 
Summary statistics from cross-sectional regressions of 302-firms receiving a subsequent 
adverse opinion, where URV and UTV are computed in the [-1,+1] event period surrounding 
the Section 404 adverse opinion date [0] 
 
ICMi = α0 + α1MWi + α2EA_Di + α3(EA_D*UE)i + α4ACC/FINi + α5LEG/REGi + α6OPERi + εi 
 
 Prediction   URV   UTV 
Intercept (?) 1.928 0.239 
     t-stat  2.47* 1.81 
MW (+) 1.877 0.341 
     t-stat  1.86* 1.92* 
EA_D (+) 4.106 0.776 
     t-stat  3.28** 3.45** 
EA_D*UE (+) 1.556 0.409 
     t-stat  2.54** 2.05* 
ACC/FIN (+) 1.986 0.410 
     t-stat  1.63 1.89* 
LEG/REG (+) 1.707 0.574 
     t-stat  0.76 1.40 
OPER (+) 0.678 0.442 
     t-stat  0.48 1.75* 
    
Adjusted R2  0.06 0.06 
# of Obs    368   368 
 
 
** and * denote significance at the 1% and 5% levels, respectively (a one-tailed test statistic when a prediction 
on the sign is made and a two-tailed test statistic otherwise).  ICM is the set of information content dependent 
variables {URV, UTV}.  All other variables are as defined in Appendix 1.  The observations winsorized in Table 
5 remain winsorized in this sub-sample. 
 
NOTE:  This model is estimated on a sample of 368 firms:  184 from the material weakness sample receiving an 
adverse opinion subsequent to their initial material weakness disclosure, along with the corresponding 184 
matched firms from the control sample. 
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